Last time we spoke about Day 2 of Operation Barbarossa. On the campaign's second day, Army Group North, led by Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb, aimed to seize Leningrad and prevent Soviet retreats. Initial assaults caught Soviet troops off guard, leading to devastating German victories. However, logistical challenges in harsh terrain began to hamper their advance. As Germany celebrated these wins, Soviet forces regrouped and mounted fierce counterattacks, demonstrating unexpected resilience amid chaos. In Finland, leveraging the situation, local activists orchestrated a rebellion in Kaunas, declaring independence and collaborating with German troops, marking a brief surge of hope among the populace. Yet, the brutality of war soon took center stage as Nazi units began committing horrific atrocities against Jewish communities. Amid these grim realities, soldiers faced not only daunting battles but also the moral implications of their actions. The tide of war began to reveal the brutal consequences of conflict, foreshadowing a dark period in history as both sides grappled with the unfolding horror of human suffering on the Eastern Front. 

This episode is: Day 3 Operation Barbarossa: The First Encirclement 

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello again, we are now on day 3 of Operation Barbarossa. Over the past two episodes we covered Army Group Center and Army Group North as they made their initial thrusts into the USSR. As the conflict unfolded, Army Group Center burst into the Soviet Union, fueled by an unstoppable momentum. The thrust was bolstered by the most formidable deployment of Luftwaffe assets ever seen on the Eastern Front. Imagine nearly 1,500 aircraft from the 2nd Air Fleet soaring through the skies, unleashing a relentless barrage on Soviet airfields, critical supply lines, and concentrations of troops. At first glance, the initial air superiority seemed like a foregone conclusion. However, this early success of the Luftwaffe belied deeper challenges lurking beneath the surface. Reconnaissance gaps and a glaring lack of close air support were quietly starting to impede the operational effectiveness of the German forces on the ground. As the campaign roared into action, German troops, led by Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group and Guderian’s 2nd Panzer Group, initiated a swift, coordinated advance. Their goal? To encircle entire Soviet armies. Key locations like Alytus and Grodno became battlegrounds where fierce tank clashes unfolded. Here, the Germans encountered the formidable T-34s of the Red Army, a new and powerful adversary. Despite their bravery, disorganization and a failure to integrate combined-arms tactics ultimately doomed the Soviet counterattacks. Today we are going to continue the story and this will set the stage for one of the most significant encirclements in modern military history at the Bialystok-Minsk Pocket.

We are now venturing back to the campaign led by Army Group Center, who are currently being supported by two air corps, 2nd Air Corps, under General of Aviation Loerzer, the 8th Air Corps under Colonel General Richthofen both of which were part of the 2nd Air Fleet, under Field Marshal Kesserling. The 8th Air Corps was tasked with supporting the 9th Army, especially Armoured Group 3, while the 2nd Air Corps  coordinated with the 4th Army, focusing primarily on Armoured Group 2. The previous successes of the Wehrmacht's land campaigns had showcased the enormous advantage Germany gained through effective combined-arms operations. Recognizing this critical synergy, Kesselring made it clear to his generals that the desires and strategies of the army were to be regarded as his own commands. This instruction underscored the necessity of collaboration, an essential element in the execution of their military plans. The commitment of air units to this campaign underscored the importance of Army Group Center as the spearhead of Operation Barbarossa. Around 1,500 planes took to the skies under the banner of the 2nd Air Fleet, boasting a formidable mix of modern light bombers, dive bombers, and fighters. In that crucial first week, these aircraft unleashed a series of raids on Soviet airfields and supply dumps, all in an effort to disrupt the Red Army’s ability to respond effectively to the invasion. By the end of this initial phase, it was clear: the Luftwaffe had overwhelmingly triumphed in the opening shots of the air war. Yet, even in this promising start, serious challenges began to emerge. 

Despite the impressive number of aircraft, there was never enough close air support available to adequately assist the frontline troops. Gaps in air reconnaissance quickly became an issue. This lack of information allowed Soviet troop concentrations to go unnoticed, resulting in missed opportunities and surprise counter-attacks. This failure to gather intelligence left the Corps and Army commanders with an incomplete tactical picture. However, amid these challenges, there were also significant successes for the close air support units of the air fleet. Throughout this tumultuous beginning, the sky remained a battleground of innovation and conflict, where both sides wrestled for dominance as the war unfolded. Some of the reasons for this was because the 8th Air Corps had been heavily involved in the capture of Crete, and with the battle concluding in early June, there was barely any time to prepare for Barbarossa. By June 21, the 8th Air Corps was critically short on resources: approximately 600 motor vehicles, 40 percent of its aircraft, and essential communication equipment were all lacking. This significant shortfall loomed large just days before the invasion. On that same day, Colonel-General Wolfram von Richthofen, the commander of the 8th Air Corps expressed deep concern, stating, “We are greatly concerned that our units are as yet unready.” Maintaining hundreds of aircraft at peak operational readiness proved to be a constant technical challenge, obscuring the stark difference between the total number of aircraft and those truly combat-ready. For instance, out of 425 dive-bombers, only 323 were actually fit for combat, and of the 98 'destroyers', merely 60 were operational. Among the 384 fighters, just 284 were combat-ready, while the total bomber force of 299 aircraft saw only 222 remain serviceable. Overall, while Air Fleet 2 boasted a total of 1,367 aircraft across all types, but only 994 were capable of executing combat operations. This issue wasn't limited to Air Fleet 2; throughout the whole Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe faced an average 25 percent fallout rate among its aircraft. Consequently, a combined strength of 2,995 aircraft translated into just 2,255 that were truly combat-ready. By the summer of 1941, it became increasingly evident that the Luftwaffe would only be able to fulfill its commitments if the war in the east could be won swiftly and with minimal losses. Practical concerns, such as oil availability, and strategic considerations regarding Britain, made a prolonged campaign simply untenable. The Luftwaffe was already stretched thin across multiple fronts, with approximately 1,566 aircraft tied down in Western Europe, the Mediterranean, North Africa, and within Germany itself. This significant dispersion of strength across less critical theaters hindered their ability to concentrate on the most vital front, the one with the narrowest window for success.

The left flank of Army Group Center was firmly anchored by the 6th Corps within the Suwalki salient. These determined troops advanced in a northwestern direction toward Vilnius, aiming to seize control of the critical bridges at Alytus on the Neman River. In their path lay several divisions of the Red Army. However, the Soviet 11th Army, led by Lieutenant General Morozov stretched thin across a wide front of 170 kilometers, offered little resistance to the relentless march of the German Panzers from the 3rd Panzer Group. It was no surprise, then, that in the early hours of the 3rd Panzer Group’s surge eastward, forward units reported encountering “only very weak or no enemy contact.” Luftwaffe reconnaissance confirmed this, identifying just one enemy artillery battery in their path. By the end of the day, Hoth’s panzer group had reached the Neman River, seizing captured bridges at Olita and Merkine. The penetration of the Soviet front was significant; Halder remarked that the panzer group had already gained the freedom of operational maneuver, but also noted in their war diary “Where the enemy appears, he fights tenaciously and courageously to the death. Defectors and those seeking to surrender were not reported from any positions. As a result, the struggle will be harder than those in Poland and the Western campaign.” The strategic importance of Alytus was clear: it needed to be secured to maintain the momentum of the offensive. On June 22, the Germans achieved a crucial victory with the capture of Alytus. Under the command of Colonel General Hoth, the 3rd Panzer Group pushed forward with incredible speed, covering a distance of 65 kilometers from their starting point to the bridges at Alytus in less than ten hours.  Afte