Last time we spoke about the fall of Kyiv. In September 1941, as the German forces encircled Kyiv under General Guderian's leadership, desperation loomed large for the Soviet Red Army. Despite their valiant efforts to withstand the siege, hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers found themselves trapped, leading to mass surrenders. Amidst the chaos, General Zhukov took command in Leningrad, rallying his troops with the stern order: “Not a step back!”. This grim scene was compounded by the chilling decision by Nazi leaders to execute thousands of Jews at Babi Yar, demonstrating the brutal lengths to which they would go in retaliation for resistance. The battle marked a turning point; while Germany celebrated its victory, deep-rooted issues within its ranks, including dwindling supplies and morale, were beginning to surface. The horror of war had only just begun, marking a tragic chapter in history that echoed far beyond the battlefield.

This episode is the Fall of Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Last week, we left off with the destruction of the Southwestern Front and the capture of Kyiv. The job of defending Leningrad was tossed over to Zhukov. Meanwhile a massive reorganization was unfolding for a new operation aimed at Moscow. Yet before we jump into that I wanted to first talk about something else, how was the German propaganda machine telling the folks back home what was going on in the east? Under Hitler’s regime, there was no clear structure for producing and disseminating state propaganda. Officially, Josef Goebbels served as the Minister of Propaganda, but he lacked absolute control over the nation’s various media outlets. Instead, he competed for influence with the Wehrmacht’s Office of Propaganda Troops and other branches of the civilian government.

While the Wehrmacht’s office was primarily supposed to focus on internal messaging, it often released reports to the press. This was a strategic move to amplify the OKW’s preferred narrative on the frontlines and promote a military-friendly storyline. Goebbels himself was less concerned with glorifying the military or its achievements unless it directly benefited the Nazi Party or bolstered his own power. For Goebbels, serving Hitler was the ultimate priority. While many others in the government were driven solely by a hunger for power, Goebbels was a true believer in Hitler's vision, which became evident in his reporting and propagandistic efforts. Despite the growing challenges of the eastern campaign, the German command remained largely convinced that a final major offensive could bring an end to the war against the Soviet Union. Recent successes in the North and South, namely, the encirclement of Leningrad and the capture of Kyiv, had revitalized enthusiasm and heightened expectations that the Soviet state was on the brink of collapse.

A pivotal factor in fostering this belief was Goebbels’s series of Sondermeldungen, or special news bulletins, which publicly proclaimed that the war was nearing its conclusion. However, the soldiers at the front had a different perspective on the accuracy of such claims. While some were buoyed by the optimism, many voiced skepticism. General Wilhelm Groener, who directed the German occupation of Ukraine in 1918, had warned against complacency in campaigning in the East. He stated, “Anyone who wants to grasp the strategic nature of the eastern theatre of war must not overlook historical recollections. Beside the gate of the vast lowland between the Vistula and the Urals, which is the home of one state and one people, stands the warning figure of Napoleon, whose fate should implant in anyone who attacks Russia a sense of horror and foreboding.” On September 26, soldier Heinz Rahe wrote to his wife about the anticipated offensive toward Moscow. He expressed hope that Moscow would be reached within fourteen to twenty days, but then added with a hint of doubt, “—but not by us.” Similarly, a non-commissioned officer with the 79th Infantry Division expressed his reservations on September 24. He noted, “Whether Russia can be defeated this year, I doubt very much. The Soviet military might is indeed broken, but the country is too vast, and capitulation is not an option for the Russians. Because two men can’t agree on their ideas, millions of men have to bleed.” In another poignant letter dated September 28, Alois Scheuer shared his experiences in the East, hinting at the numerous difficulties he faced. He remarked, “What I have experienced and lived through in this quarter of a year in Russia, I cannot put into words. There is so much I wish to forget and never be reminded of again. I always try not to lose hope and courage, but there are hours when the loneliness and desolation are almost unbearable.”

While many soldiers at the front expressed their doubts and yearned for an end to the war, Goebbels's victory propaganda continued to resonate effectively, particularly within Germany. Classified reports from the SD or “Sicherheitsdienst”gauging public opinion revealed that, as of September 25, fears of positional warfare in the East and the likelihood of a winter campaign had largely faded. A follow-up report on September 29 confirmed that more and more people were beginning to believe in a German victory before winter set in. Despite this success, Goebbels was troubled by the extent of the rising optimism. In his diary entry from September 27, he observed, “The depression is now completely gone. At times, the mood of the people goes far beyond the real possibilities. Once again, there’s hope that this winter the war will be over, and we have much to do in the next weeks to temper this extreme optimism to a more realistic level.” This palpable sense of optimism was felt even at the front, where many desperately clung to the belief that victory was near. On September 28, Hans-Albert Giese wrote to his mother, “In the next few days, we will again march somewhat further. We look forward to it because the quicker we advance, the sooner we can return home to Germany. The news from the past few days has been really great. These Bolsheviks won’t last much longer.” Another soldier, Ernst Guicking, shared similar sentiments in a letter to his wife dated September 29. He stated, “Kiev is done. Now it’s the turn of Army Group Centre. The great final chord will soon be played in the East. All our hopes are pinned on the coming four weeks.

As the war progressed, Goebbels struggled to balance the expectations and morale of the civilian population with the harsh realities of the situation. The Wehrmacht was experiencing victories, but things had not unfolded as planned, despite what Hitler proclaimed to the public. While official reports boasted that the Red Army was on its last legs, Goebbels was increasingly anxious about public opinion, especially as the war inevitably stretched into 1942 and beyond. Throughout the conflict, the messaging from the German state regarding the situation in the East was anything but clear. Evidence suggests that this lack of clarity impacted morale both within the armed forces and among civilians. Hitler had never been entirely secure from the threat of an internal coup, and his security situation would continue to deteriorate over the coming months and years. This decline wasn't solely due to waning morale caused by inconsistent and vague propaganda that diverged from the realities of war. Initially, Hitler’s strategic management had helped stave off coup attempts during his reign. However, his forthcoming failures would ignite discontent in the future. Propaganda had been a crucial element of the Nazi state's success in maintaining control over Germany, but the cracks were starting to show in its armor. By the end of September 1941, even ordinary soldiers were beginning to openly question the wisdom of the war. For instance, in the aftermath of the fighting around Kyiv, one soldier reflected on these sentiments in a letter home “Three months ago today the campaign against Russia began. Everybody supposed at the time that the Bolsheviks would be ripe for capitulation within no more than eight to ten weeks. That assumption, however, was based on a widespread ignorance of the Russian war materiel...Just this morning we happened to hear that, for example near Kiev, 600 guns and 150,000 men were captured. What kind of figures are those! Russia is almost inexhaustible”.

Things began to grind to a halt at Leningrad. The German advance, now almost entirely devoid of armored support, was stalling at the Pulkovo Heights. The suburban areas surrounding the city proved to be a tough challenge. In the North, the Finns hesitated to attack, leaving their German allies struggling to push them further. Any hope for a link-up on the eastern shores of Lake Ladoga had to come from Army Group North, but with the 4th Panzer Group reassigned to Army Group Center for the foreseeable future, this prospect was all but impossible. On September 25, the 16th Army was pushed back from the eastern bank of the Neva River. The Soviets continued their assault,