Last time we spoke about the beginning of Operation Typhoon. In September 1941, Leningrad faced a brutal siege. Amidst this chaos, General Zhukov rallied his troops with the grim order, “Not a step back!” While the Axis celebrated victories, soldiers at the front grew skeptical of the Nazi propaganda that inflated confidence. As the Germans prepared for Operation Typhoon, a decisive offensive aimed at seizing Moscow, logistical strains became apparent. The advance stalled, and any hope for quick victory faded. However, both sides braced for a monumental clash. Stalin and Zhukov vowed to defend the capital, with the latter asserting that they would hold Moscow at all costs. With over a million troops and abundant resources, the Germans believed victory was within reach. Yet, the Soviet defenses, fortified and resolute, stood in their way. Both the Axis and the Red Army prepared for battle, knowing the outcome would alter the course of the war. The struggle for Moscow loomed, a pivotal moment that promised a harrowing chapter in history.

This episode is Winter is Coming 

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Massive formations of Panzers advance through the heart of the Soviet Union, sweeping aside all resistance. Hundreds of thousands of Red Army soldiers find themselves encircled, with little hope of breaking free to fight another day. The siege of Leningrad tightens as the Nazis press their advantage. In the south, the Southwestern Front still bears the scars of the devastating battle of Kyiv, where countless men now lie dead across the steppes. Meanwhile, Crimea faces a new assault, as the invaders prepare to drive towards the Don River. The conflict over Leningrad continues to devolve into a stalemate, and Army Group South grapples with the vastness of Ukraine while contending with its scarce resources. As we move into October, the weather shifts noticeably along the entire front. Snow has already begun to fall in the north, while rainstorms have caused intermittent delays. In summer, such storms typically lasted only days; now, they stretch on for weeks. Fall is firmly upon us, and winter approaches quickly. The weather was beginning to change. As Ned Stark said “Winter is coming”. 

During the first week of October, significant changes were implemented in the organization of the Ostheer by Hitler and the OKH. Most notably, the Panzer Groups were re-designated as Panzer Armies. This change was more than just a new title; it reflected the increasing importance of armored units within the German military strategy. Previously, these groups had been subordinated to field armies, which often resulted in friction between commanders, particularly between Guderian and Kluge during the early phases of operations. This friction created significant challenges throughout the chain of command. It began even before the war and persisted into the campaign in France. Guderian and Kluge’s personal animosity added to the strain. However, they were not alone in their frustrations; other commanders also felt the negative impact of the previous organizational structure. This hierarchy caused confusion within the chain of command and left Panzer leaders feeling constrained, desiring greater independence in their operations. Now, with the new designation as Panzer Armies, they would report directly to Army Group Commanders. This shift was aimed at enhancing the coordination of resources and expanding strategic options across the front. In theory, this new structure would streamline decision-making and improve the effectiveness of armored units in combat.

By October 1, the offensive capabilities of Army Group North had diminished significantly. Leeb informed Hitler that he could not launch any major offensives without additional reinforcements. Given the limited reinforcements received in late September, he had to work with what he had. Leeb still commanded 2 Panzer divisions and 2 motorized infantry divisions within General of Panzer Troops Schmidt’s 39th Corps. He intended to employ these mobile forces in a limited offensive. Leeb considered 2 options for his attack. The first was to break through the Soviet 8th Army at Oranienbaum, a promising choice. However, Leeb ultimately decided to focus on linking up with the Finns. This plan involved launching an attack northeast toward Volkhov, aiming to destroy the Soviet 54th Army in the process.

Hitler intervened and rejected the proposed plan. He insisted that Leeb instead attack toward Tikhvin first, then counter-march northeast to encircle the 54th Army at Volkhov. This plan likely appeared more appealing on the map tables of the dictator’s bunker than Leeb’s modest proposal. However, it overlooked crucial factors. An operation of this scale required more troops than Army Group North could muster, and it disregarded the fragile condition of the forces besieging Leningrad. Nonetheless, in a clear demonstration of Hitler’s growing disconnect from reality, and the weak resolve of the Nazi generals, Leeb accepted the plan. After some back and forth, the dictator ultimately got his way. Schmidt’s Corps was designated as the main effort toward Tikhvin, supported by 4 infantry divisions on the flanks. The 11th, 21st, 254th, and 126th Infantry Divisions were positioned south of the Shisselburg corridor and would need to redeploy to support the Panzers. Due to this requirement and the need to stockpile supplies, the attack was scheduled for October 16. Notably, the distances involved were relatively short, at less than 100 kilometers. When accounting for the delays in redeployment and logistics, the contrast with the early days of Operation Barbarossa becomes stark. The Wehrmacht remained an extremely competent and dangerous adversary, but its period of absolute dominance was clearly fading. Meanwhile, the Stavka was not resting idly. Even while addressing the potential collapse of the Western Front, they had to focus on developments in the Northwest. The Leningrad and Northwestern Fronts were instructed to prepare for another attempt to breach the vital German corridor at Shisselburg. A launch date was set for later in the month, pending the completion of preparations and a reorganization of the command structure.

Further south, Operation Typhoon represented far more than just another offensive; it was the culmination of months of intense fighting and hundreds of thousands of German casualties. The Nazi state had convinced itself, from top to bottom, not only of the inevitability of victory but also of its swiftness. Although the disappointment over the failure of Operation Barbarossa to destroy the Soviet Union was palpable, it was only mentioned obliquely.  On the night of October 1, 1941, just hours before Operation Typhoon was set to begin, Adolf Hitler issued a proclamation that was to be read aloud to the troops on the eastern front “Soldiers! When I called on you to ward off the danger threatening our homeland on 22 June, you faced the greatest military power of all time. In barely three months, thanks to your bravery, my comrades, it has been possible to destroy one tank brigade after another belonging to this opponent, to eliminate countless divisions, to take uncounted prisoners, to occupy endless space … You have taken over 2,400,000 prisoners, you have destroyed or captured 17,500 tanks and over 21,000 guns, you have downed or destroyed on the ground 14,200 planes. The world has never seen anything like this!”.

While Hitler emphasized the unprecedented nature of the Ostheer’s success, his comments also hinted at Operation Barbarossa’s failure to eliminate Soviet resistance. “This time,” he confidently promised, everything would proceed “according to plan” to deliver the long-awaited “deadly blow” to the Soviet Union. With characteristic bravado, Hitler declared: “Today, the last great decisive battle of this year begins.” Yet not everyone was convinced. Wolf Dose, a soldier in the 58th Infantry Division, wrote in his diary “The Führer has told us that the decisive battle in the east is beginning, a battle that will finish off the Russians, but how and where he did not say. I do not believe that the Soviet Union will capitulate.”Others were more outspoken. “The last great decisive battle of the year, my God! And what is the decisive result supposed to be, Moscow, Kharkov, the Volga?” Throughout Germany, morale had been boosted by the recent wave of Sondermeldungen, but for those German soldiers in the forward trenches of Bock’s army group, those who had resisted fierce Soviet attacks for the past 2 months, there were far fewer illusions about the difficulties of ending the war in the east. The new drive on Moscow presented daunting challenges. In the immediate prelude to Operation Typhoon, Heinrich Haape recorded the activity observed on the Soviet side of the line “East of the Mezha, the Russians prepared a strong system of trenches, bunkers, tank-traps and barbed-wire entanglements. They laid minefields, reinforced their front-line troops, brought up supplies and gathered their strength to stand against us once more. We had t