Last time we spoke about the beginning of the battle for Kyiv. In August 1941, as Nazi Germany advanced towards Kyiv, their confidence in a swift victory began to wane. General Fedor von Bock's forces had captured Smolensk, yet the Soviet Red Army, led by Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, mounted an unexpected and resilient defense. The Soviets, despite their heavy losses, rallied and mobilized millions, initiating counteroffensives that demonstrated their vast potential. Amidst the chaos, logistical troubles plagued the German troops, stretching their resources thin and leading to growing unrest among soldiers grappling with devastating casualties. As the battle for Kyiv intensified, the realization dawned on German commanders that their aggressive strategy was failing, with victory slipping from their grasp. 

This episode is Zhukov, Guderian and the race to Kyiv

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Tension stretches from Berlin, the capital of Germany, to Moscow, the heart of Russia, as military commanders and powerful leaders strategize their next moves. One side contemplates a decisive action, while the other fears that too much territory has already been surrendered. The Red Army must now prepare to confront the Wehrmacht, in a critical battle just outside Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine. Last week marked a turning point as fighting in the sector of Army Group Center came to a standstill, largely due to exhaustion among the troops. In response, Adolf Hitler commanded General Guderian to redirect his forces south toward Ukraine, while General Hermann Hoth provided support for Army Group North, advancing from the north.

On August 20, a report from the 2nd Army's 267th Infantry Division noted that over the preceding six days, the division had suffered around 1,000 casualties, bringing its total losses since the war began in the east to approximately 2,700 men. Within the LIII Army Corps, which included the 267th Infantry Division, overall losses reached 192 officers and 5,500 soldiers by August 22. At the war's outset, the average German infantry division consisted of about 17,000 troops. By the end of August 1941, the impact of casualties on these divisions was significant. In 14 of the divisions, losses had exceeded 4,000 men; in 40 divisions, over 3,000; in 30 divisions, over 2,000; and 58 divisions recorded losses of fewer than 2,000. On August 21, fighting around the Yel’nya salient, a bulge in the front line near the Smolensk region, began to ease as the Soviet 24th Army regrouped and received reinforcements in preparation for a major offensive expected by the end of the month. Even during this period of relative calm, the German IX Army Corps, tasked with defending the northern flank of the salient, was so severely understrength that engineers, desperately needed to build roads behind the front, were forced to fight as infantry for weeks.

The term “quiet” seems almost ironic considering the continuous losses being inflicted. The 137th Infantry Division was reportedly losing over 50 men daily in localized skirmishes between August 20 and 30, while the neighboring 263rd Infantry Division lost around 1,200 men from August 20 to 27, averaging about 150 losses per day. Following an inspection of the Yel’nya frontline, Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder was told, “Troops are very strained. Enemy artillery activity is unpleasant, and our munitions are limited. Mines and wire are absent.” As August came to a close, the anticipated Soviet offensive finally commenced, featuring eight rifle divisions, two tank divisions, and one motorized infantry division, all supported by 800 artillery guns, mortars, and multiple rocket launchers. The Soviet forces, under General Georgy Zhukov's Reserve Front, were organized into two shock groups positioned north and south of the salient. For the first time, this offensive was coordinated with simultaneous attacks by the Western Front in the north at Dukhovshchina and the Bryansk Front in the south at Roslavl and Novozybkov. On the offensive’s first day, August 30, the Soviets penetrated ten kilometers into the southern flank of General Günther von Kluge’s forces, prompting Field Marshal Fedor von Bock to dispatch two divisions, including the 10th Panzer Division, to stabilize the situation. Heavy fighting ensued until September 2, when Bock decided to abandon the Yel’nya salient, deeming it purposeless and noting that the divisions there were being "bled white" over time. Thus, after six weeks of fierce combat and staggering losses, the Yel’nya salient ultimately proved ineffective, an appalling illustration of the aimless strategic direction of Army Group Centre. As soldier Franz Frisch, who fought in these battles, later reflected…

“Officially it was called a ‘planned withdrawal’, and a ‘correction of the front lines.’ . . . But to me it was so much bullshit. The Russians were kicking us badly and we had to regroup . . . The next day – or maybe a few days later – we heard on the radio, in the ‘news from the front’ (Wehrmachtsbericht) about the ‘successful front correction’ in our Yel’nya defensive line, which was east of Smolensk, and the enormous losses we had inflicted on the enemy. But no single word was heard about a retreat, about the hopelessness of the situation, about the mental and emotional stagnation and numbness of the German soldiers. In short, it was again a ‘victory’. But we on the front line were running back like rabbits in front of the fox. This metamorphosis of the truth from ‘all shit’ to ‘it was a victory’ baffled me, and those of my comrades who dared to think”.

Franz Frisch was not the only German soldier to be taken aback by the stark contrast between the glorified wartime propaganda and the harsh reality faced at the front lines. Georg Grossjohann, an officer who had been stationed in France during the early weeks of Operation Barbarossa, later recounted his experiences after the war: “When I was moved to the east [in the late summer of 1941] I was actually convinced that I would be too late to see action. Reichspressechef [German press chief] Dr Dietrich declared on the radio that all that was needed in Russia from that point in the late summer would be ‘police actions’. Well, I was taught differently when I arrived there . . . There was tremendous bitterness amongst the infantry soldiers at the front over the misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the realities of their situation”.

In the late summer of 1941, images of victorious advances into enemy territory had become relics of past wars, often propagandized in news reels. For the average German soldier, or Landser, the grim reality of life on the Eastern Front began to mirror the harrowing experiences of trench warfare. Corporal W.F. expressed his despair on August 22, stating, “We have suffered greatly under the Russian artillery fire, and we must live day and night in our foxholes for protection from shrapnel. The holes are filled with water, and lice and other vermin have already made their way in.” Another soldier, Erich Mende, observed how digging deeper was nearly impossible, as ground water would appear after just 50 centimeters. Meanwhile, fellow soldier Harald Henry wrote in a letter home on August 18, “It would be no overstatement to say that ‘a dog wouldn’t want to go on living like this,’ as no creature could endure such primitive conditions. All day long, we huddle in the ground, twisted in narrow holes, facing the sun and rain without respite, desperately trying to sleep.” If the living conditions were harsh, they were only compounded by the constant terrors of combat that dominated life on the front. Just days later, on August 22, Henry expressed his mental anguish in another letter, capturing the toll of war on his psyche. “Yesterday was a day so immersed in blood, so full of dead and wounded, so blasted by crackling salvoes, shrapnel from shells and groans and shrieks of the wounded, that I can not yet write about it . . . As if by a wonder I was drawn from the heaviest fighting in the afternoon and remain until now unhurt . . . At any rate my old non-commissioned officer Grabke and many other comrades are dead.”

In contrast to the chaotic early weeks of the war, when Soviet armies struggled with command and control, the stabilization of the front alleviated much of the pressure on the Soviet forces, enabling them to improve the coordination of their operations. This shift was evident in German assessments of Soviet combat performance. On August 6, Strauss reported that the Red Army had become a "well-led, tough, powerful enemy with a great deal of artillery and a strong air force." Three days later, a command conference at Panzer Group 3 described the enemy as a "[g]reat mass" still capable of fighting. Their armaments were characterized as “good,” and their artillery was reported to be "much more proficient than in the early days" of the conflict. This analysis reflected a radical shift from the dismissive evaluations made just three weeks earlier.

A crucial question arose: "How much longer until the Russian fighting strength is broken?" The answer was unce