Last time we spoke about Day 4 Operation Barbarossa: Chaos in Ukraine. As Operation Barbarossa unfolded, Army Group South advanced into Ukraine, driven by the need to secure critical oil reserves for Germany’s war machine. Initial gains were swift, as the German forces used air superiority to capture key positions. However, logistical issues quickly surfaced, revealing the vulnerabilities of their supply lines. Soviet General Kirponos, although initially caught off guard, managed to organize defenses and counterattacks thanks to a well-structured communication system. Despite their numerical advantages, the Red Army was plagued by disorganization and outdated tactics. The clash at Dubno highlighted this struggle, with Soviet forces launching piecemeal assaults that were easily countered by the more coordinated German defenses. As battles raged, both sides faced the brutal realities of war, heavy losses and the harsh conditions of the Eastern Front. 

This episode is the Red Army on the Run

Well hello there, welcome to the Easter Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

Well hello there, welcome back, we have just got through week one of Operation Barbarossa and now its time to head into week two.  

In the opening days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe achieved remarkable success, obliterating a staggering number of Soviet aircraft. The air battle on the Eastern Front was indeed a chaotic spectacle, yet it's important to note that it wasn't as one-sided as some histories have portrayed. In the early days of Operation Barbarossa, the Luftwaffe unleashed devastation upon the Soviet Air Force, racking up staggering losses that reached into the thousands. One source reported that by the end of June, the Luftwaffe had destroyed 4,614 Soviet aircraft, with 3,176 of those taken out on the ground and 1,438 in aerial combat. In stark contrast, German losses amounted to just 330 planes. These figures highlight a clear German superiority in the skies, but for various reasons, this supremacy was fleeting. Following the doctrines of blitzkrieg, the Luftwaffe's primary objective in the East was to gain immediate control of the airspace above Soviet territory. In an impressive display of force, they achieved total domination of the skies within just two days, inflicting chaos on Soviet airfields in the western districts. This victory enabled the Luftwaffe to shift focus toward supporting ground operations. 

However, lurking behind the front lines were thousands of Soviet aircraft, strategically stationed further back from the border and in the Soviet interior. These planes had managed to survive the initial onslaught and would eventually be relocated to new airfields. During this brief window of Luftwaffe dominance, concerns began to surface. Major General Hoffman von Waldau, head of the Luftwaffe's operations department, conveyed his worries to Halder on July 1st. "The air force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy," he warned. "It's quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes." Just two days later, he further reflected in his diary that the Soviet military capabilities were significantly stronger than pre-war assessments indicated. “The material quality is better than expected. Though we achieved great successes with relatively low losses, a large number of Soviet aircraft remain to be destroyed.” Despite the Luftwaffe's initial triumphs, they now faced the daunting challenge of balancing support for the army while contending with a resurgent Soviet aerial presence. As the operational theater expanded at a rapid pace, the Luftwaffe's already limited resources became stretched thin. Air bases had to be relocated eastward to newly established, poorly equipped airfields, where inadequate supply lines hindered their effectiveness just as much as they did for the ground troops. These new airfields were also particularly vulnerable to attacks from roaming enemy groups infiltrating the rear areas. While the Luftwaffe experienced significant successes, the Soviet Air Force was not without its victories. In July 1941, Soviet pilots managed to raid German airfields, inflicting damage on the Luftwaffe as well. One Soviet pilot vividly recalled an attack near Bobruisk: “Approaching our target, the Shturmoviks flew low to the ground. As our leader turned to launch the assault, missiles struck the rows of bombers, causing explosions. Tracer bullets shredded the wings adorned with black crosses. Just above the earth, our Shturmoviks released their hundred-kilo bombs, igniting Junkers and Messerschmitts prepped for takeoff. We arrived just in time to prevent the enemy from launching their operations! Our regiment repeatedly struck Bobruisk airfield, causing significant damage and destroying dozens of bombers and Messerschmitts.”

As the frontlines surged forward, reconnaissance units struggled to keep pace with the fast-moving Panzer divisions. Even though the initial weeks of the campaign had seemed relatively light in terms of losses, skepticism lingered among key figures. On July 1st, Major General Waldau, commander of the 10th Air Corps, communicated a stark warning to the head of the Army High Command, General Halder. He expressed concerns that the Luftwaffe had drastically underestimated the strength of the Soviet Air Force, now estimating their numbers to exceed 8000 aircraft. Halder was taken aback, unable to accept such a figure. Just days before, the Luftwaffe's own strength had barely surpassed 3500 planes. The idea that the Soviets could have lost over four thousand planes and still possess a similar number ready for battle seemed implausible. Halder wasn’t alone in his disbelief. The senior leadership of the Luftwaffe shared his sentiment, dismissing Waldau’s grim assessment. They were riding high on the belief that they had secured a monumental victory, and any contrary evidence only dampened their spirits. To their credit, they had indeed decimated a significant portion of the Soviet Air Force, and their influence remained pivotal in the ongoing battlefield struggles around Minsk, Kyiv, and Leningrad. However, their major flaw lay in their unwillingness to acknowledge that the war was far from over. The early weeks of the conflict revealed a harsh truth: victory could not be seized in a single stroke. A decisive triumph was proving elusive, regardless of how fiercely the Luftwaffe's commanders clung to their beliefs. This goes to a larger point about whether or not Germany could ever have managed a truly decisive victory over the USSR. A decisive battle is one that decides a war. This is an elusive concept at any rate and one that is debated at the highest levels of intellectual circles in military theory. The now dominant understanding of the Second World War as an industrial conflict decided on the production lines and the mines of the combatants precludes any discussion of “decisive battles.”

As the second week of the war unfolded, Army Group North continued to make significant strides. On July 1st, they captured Riga, and Pskov was now within reach. The Soviet Northwestern Front was in disarray, with roughly twenty out of the thirty-one divisions that began the campaign operating at less than half strength. In response to this dire situation, Colonel General F. Kuznetsov was replaced by Lieutenant General Sobennikov. Sobennikov had been the 8th Army commander during the first week of the war. He was replaced in this role by Lieutenant General Ivanov. To further bolster the command structure, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Stavka, Lieutenant General Vatutin, was sent to the front headquarters. This marked one of the early instances of a practice that would become a hallmark of the war. The Stavka regularly dispatched representatives to front commands, serving as both advisors and overseers to ensure that orders were executed precisely. For now, Vatutin faced the daunting task of restoring the front lines and preventing further German breakthroughs. However, he wasn’t given any additional resources to accomplish this monumental challenge.

From the German perspective, the initial weeks in the North were marked by rapid advances interspersed with periods of regrouping. The only significant combat during the first week of the invasion occurred at Raseiniai, as discussed in our previous podcast. The Red Army fought fiercely wherever it could, but much of the early phase of Operation Barbarossa was characterized by a chaotic retreat. The Northwestern Front was sacrificing territory in a desperate attempt to stall Colonel General Hoepner’s Panzer spearheads. The 4th Panzer Group maneuvered between the infantry divisions of Army Group North as they swung northeast and then north through the Baltic region. Positioned as the southern spearhead was Colonel General Manstein’s 56th Panzer Corps, which made rapid progress in the initial days of the war but faced a fierce Soviet counterattack that they had to fend off without support. Meanwhile, Colonel General Reinhardt’s 41st Panzer Corps engaged at Raseiniai, participating in one of the largest tank battles witnessed thus far in the conflict. By July 3r