Last time we spoke about the how Hitler’s summer triumph turned bitter. Initially buoyed by early victories, the Wehrmacht, led by General Fedor von Bock, aimed to capture Moscow by encircling the critical city of Smolensk. However, under the leadership of Marshal Semyon Timoshenko, the Red Army mounted an unexpectedly resilient defense. Despite suffering heavy losses, Soviet forces regrouped and undertook strategic reforms, relocating factories to enhance their production of tanks and aircraft. The situation intensified on July 15 as intense battles erupted in Smolensk, with German troops managing to encircle the city. Still, the Red Army's tenacity began to emerge. As the Germans celebrated capturing Smolensk on July 16, the broader picture reflected a grim reality; their supply lines stretched thin, and casualties mounted. Amidst shifting dynamics, the Red Army showcased formidable spirit and adaptability, hinting at a turning point in the war. Though Smolensk fell, the fierce resistance and evolving tactics foreshadowed challenges to come for the Wehrmacht, revealing the struggle and determination of those fighting on the Eastern Front. 

This episode is the Hitler’s Orders vs Reality: Chaos on the Eastern Front

Well hello there, welcome to the Eastern Front week by week podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800’s until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. 

As August 1941 unfolds, the once-unshakeable illusion of a swift German victory begins to show signs of fracture. In this ninth podcast of our Eastern Front Week-by-Week series, the Wehrmacht finds itself in a precarious position, trapped between encircled Soviet forces and a resilient Red Army that refuses to succumb to defeat. At Smolensk, a significant city located in western Russia, the Soviets defy expectations by reopening the encirclement just days after it had been sealed. This audacious maneuver compels the German panzer groups, renowned for their rapid mobility, to delay their much-needed rest and refitting. The harsh reality of warfare sets in, as the promised quick victory turns into a struggle against the relentless Soviet defenders. To the south, the Uman encirclement, a brutal confrontation in Ukraine, concludes with staggering losses for the Soviet forces. While the Germans achieve a tactical victory, the cost in terms of men and resources begins to mount alarmingly for the invaders. The expansive fields of Ukraine become a graveyard for both sides, with each loss fueling the fires of conflict. Meanwhile, the Red Army is not standing idle. They mobilize millions of personnel from their vast reserves, forming new field armies even as their older counterparts are systematically dismantled on the battlefield. This resilience is a testament to the Soviet spirit, embodying their commitment to defending their homeland against the Axis onslaught. In the northern sector, Army Group North prepares for a decisive push toward Leningrad, the jewel city in the east, known for its historical and cultural significance. The forces commit their remaining strength in a desperate, last-ditch effort to seize this vital urban center. The stakes are incredibly high, as the city holds not only military importance but also symbolic value in the hearts of the Russian people.

While the German offensive strength was increasingly waning, the Soviet Union launched one of the most remarkable mobilization programs in military history. During much of the 1920s and 1930s, the Red Army developed an extensive cadre system, which maintained a small number of active-duty soldiers during peacetime but could be rapidly expanded by reservists in times of war. To support this system, the Universal Military Service Law of 1938 extended the age of enlistment for army reserves to 50 years old and established numerous new military schools to accommodate the influx of trainees. By the eve of the German invasion, the Red Army had built a mobilization base of 14 million men. By the end of June 1941, approximately 5.3 million reservists had been called up, with further mobilizations occurring in rapid succession. This cadre system allowed for an extraordinary rate of force generation, effectively outmaneuvering German intelligence estimates and obscuring the true strength of the Soviet military. In July 1941, no fewer than 13 new field armies were formed, followed by an additional 14 in August. Although these newly constituted reserve armies were not as well equipped or trained as the professional soldiers they replaced, the changing tide of warfare began to favor them as German mobile forces weakened. As the conflict transitioned to positional warfare, these new armies had the opportunity to improve their training and tactics.

While it is essential not to trivialize the scale of the military disaster experienced on the Western Front in Belorussia, it remains true that the Soviet Union's force generation scheme allowed for quick replenishment of its losses and a dramatic expansion of the Red Army's size. On June 22, 1941, the Red Army numbered 5,373,000 men; by August 31, despite suffering significant losses, this figure had grown to 6,889,000, and by December 31, 1941, the army reached an estimated eight million personnel. After the war, German military leaders, such as General Fritz Blumentritt, acknowledged the fundamental issue of latent Soviet military strength. Reflecting on the German offensive plans aimed at encircling and destroying the Red Army before they could regroup behind the Dnepr and Dvina rivers, Blumentritt posed a haunting rhetorical question: "But what if armies, millions strong, had not yet even been mobilized and only parts of the Red Army were in western Russia?" While the Soviet loss of tanks proved acutely felt, given that tanks were harder to replace, many historians have overstated the extent of German successes. At the onset of the war, the Soviet tank inventory numbered an impressive 23,767 tanks; however, this total reflected Soviet production dating back to the 1920s and included many models that had become obsolete on the modern battlefield. Of this number, around 15,000 tanks were from older T-26 and BT series, with estimates suggesting that the majority were in dire need of repair.

Moreover, untrained crews, severe shortages of ammunition, fuel, and spare parts, as well as the absence of supporting arms like air cover, contributed to the scene of Soviet tanks littering the battlefields, even if they made it that far at all. Thus, the apparently staggering German successes, often highlighted by the sheer number of Soviet tanks destroyed, can be better understood as a disaster waiting to unfold for the Soviets. Inept planning and direction within the Soviet military profoundly affected the outcome, as the large quantities of outdated equipment inflated the perception of German victory. In reality, even without the specific blunders committed by the Soviets, the great bulk of their mechanized army was likely to struggle against the German forces. Yet, what was fundamentally crucial for the future of the conflict was the production of new and more effective tanks. In this regard, Soviet leadership acted with notable resolve. Amid the relentless advance of the German forces, the gigantic evacuation of Soviet industry to the east in 1941 became essential for ensuring the economic resilience of the Soviet Union. Undertaken with remarkable speed and under the most adverse circumstances, including aerial bombardments from the Luftwaffe, hundreds of factories were uprooted, transported deep into the interior, and rapidly reassembled. The scale and complexity of such an undertaking are hard to fathom, especially in light of the national crisis gripping the country. Here, the post-war Soviet literature’s use of grandiose terms such as "heroic" and "historic" seems justified.

Between July and November, a staggering 1,523 industrial enterprises were relocated to the Volga region, Siberia, or Central Asia, amounting to an impressive 1.5 million railway wagonloads of equipment and materials. More remarkably, production of vital war materials actually increased in the latter half of 1941, with official production figures for items like tanks being exceeded. Indeed, the Soviet Union produced more tanks in 1941 than Germany, with 66 percent of these being the newer T-34 and KV-1 models. Additionally, Soviet industry outproduced Germany in aircraft and artillery pieces, effectively meeting the immediate needs of the Red Army. In assessing the outcome of Germany’s first major encirclement battle on the Eastern Front, it becomes apparent that the German military leadership overestimated the ramifications of their victories on the Soviet Union’s ability to maintain a coherent front. Conversely, the Germans failed to effectively balance the demands of securing a tight perimeter around the eastern edge of their encirclement with the necessity of swiftly capitalizing on their successes by continuing their advance. The root cause of this oversight, evident even in the early stages of the war, lay in a shortage of sufficient mobile forces needed to accomplish the tasks at hand. Consequently, as losses mounted and the campaign expanded toward more ambitious objectives over vast distances,